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Abstract. It is standard to regard the intuitionistic restriction of a classical logic
as increasing the expressivity of the logic because the classical logic can be ade-
quately represented in the intuitionistic logic by double-negation, while the other
direction has no truth-preserving propositional encodings. We show here that
subexponential logic, which is a family of substructural refinements of classi-
cal logic, each parametric over a preorder over the subexponential connectives,
does not suffer from this asymmetry if the preorder is systematically modified as
part of the encoding. Precisely, we show a bijection between synthetic (i.e., fo-
cused) partial sequent derivations modulo a given encoding. Particular instances
of our encoding for particular subexponential preorders give rise to both known
and novel adequacy theorems for substructural logics.
1 Introduction
In [13], Miller writes:
“While there is some recognition that logic is a unifying and universal disci-
pline underlying computer science, it is far more accurate to say that its uni-
versal character has been badly fractured . . . one wonders if there is any sense
to insisting that there is a core notion of ‘logic’.”
Possibly the oldest such split is along the classical/intuitionistic seam, and each side
can be seen as more universal than the other. Classical logics, the domain of traditional
mathematics, generally have an elegant symmetry in the connectives that can often
be exploited to create sophisticated proof search and model checking algorithms. On
the other hand, intuitionistic logics, which introduce an asymmetry between multiple
hypotheses and single conclusions, can express the computational notion of function
directly, making it the preferred choice for programming languages and logical frame-
works. Can the rift between these two sides be bridged?
Miller proposes one approach: to use structural proof theory, particularly the proof
theory of focused sequent calculi, as a unifying language for logical formalisms. There
is an important proof theoretic difference between a given classical logic and its in-
tuitionistic restriction (see defn. 8): the classical formulas can be encoded using the
intuitionistic connectives in such a way that classical provability is preserved, i.e., a
formula is classically provable if and only if its encoding is intuitionistically provable.
In the other direction, however, there are no such general encodings. The classical logic
will either have to be extended (for example, with terms and quantifiers) or refined with
substructural or modal operators. For this reason, intuitionistic logics are sometimes
considered to be more expressive than their classical counterparts.
In this paper, we compare logical calculi for “universality” using the specific techni-
cal apparatus of adequate propositional encodings. That is, given a formula in a source
logic O, we must be able to encode it in a target logic M that must preserve the atomic
predicates and must reuse the reasoning principles of M, particularly its notion of prov-
ability. An example of such an encoding would be ordinary classical logic encoded in
ordinary intuitionistic logic where each classical formula A is encoded as the intuition-
istic formula ¬¬A. We can go further and also reuse the proofs of the target calculus; in
fact, there are at least the following levels of adequacy:
Definition 1 (levels of adequacy) An encoding of formulas (equiv. of sequents) from a
source to a target calculus is
– globally adequate if a formula is true (equiv. a sequent is derivable) in the source
calculus iff its encoding is true (equiv. the encoding of the sequent is derivable) in
the target calculus;
– adequate if the proofs of a formula (equiv. a sequent) in the source calculus are in
bijection with the proofs of the encoding of the formula (equiv. the sequent) in the
target calculus; and
– locally adequate if open derivations (i.e., partial proofs with possibly unproved
premises) of a formula (equiv. a sequent) in the source calculus are in bijection
with the open derivations of the formula (equiv. the sequent) in the target calculus.
Local adequacy is an ideal for encodings because it is a strong justification for see-
ing the target calculus as more universal: (partial) proofs in the source calculus can be
recovered at any level of detail. However, it is unachievable except in trivial situations.
Indeed, even adequacy is often difficult; for instance, the linear formula !a ⊸ !b ⊸ !a
has three sequent proofs, differing in the order in which the second ⊸ and the two !s
are introduced, but there is only a single sequent proof of a ⊃ b ⊃ a.
It is nevertheless possible to define a kind of local adequacy that is more flexi-
ble: adequacy up to permutations of inference rules entirely inside one of the phases
of focusing. A focused proof [1] is a proof that makes large synthetic rules that are
maximal chains of positive or negative inference rules. An inference rule is positive,
sometimes called synchronous, if it involves an essential choice, while it is negative or
asynchronous if the choices it presents (if any) are inessential. The term “focus” de-
scribes the way positive inferences are chained to form synthetic steps: each inference
is applied (read from conclusion to premises) to a single formula under focus, and the
operands of this connective remain under focus in the premises.
Definition 2 (focal adequacy) An encoding of sequents from a source to a target fo-
cused calculus is focally adequate if they have the same synthetic inference rules.
Since focusing abstracts away the inessential permutations of inference rules, a fo-
cally adequate encoding can be used to compare logics for “essential universality”.
Surprisingly, there are very few known focal adequacy results (see [4,11] for practically
all such known results). This paper fills in many of the gaps for existing (substruc-
tural) logics by proving a pair of general encodings (see theorems 12 and 17) about
subexponential logics [8,15]. It is well known that the exponentials of linear logic are
non-canonical. If a pre-order is imposed upon them with suitable conditions, then the
resulting logic is well-behaved, satisfying identity, admitting cuts, and allowing focus-
ing. Moreover, classical, intuitionistic, and linear logics can be seen as instances of
subexponential logic for particular collections of subexponentials. Our encodings are
generic, parametric on the subexponential signature of the source and target logics. As
particular instances, we obtain focal adequacy results for: classical logic (CL) in in-
tuitionistic logic (IL), IL in classical linear logic (CLL), CLL in intuitionistic linear
logic (ILL), and an indefinite bidirectional chain between classical and intuitionistic
subexponential logics, all of which are novel. Moreover, our encodings show that any
analysis (such as cut-elimination) or algorithm (such as proof search) that is generic on
the subexponential signature cannot (and need not) distinguish between classical and
intuitionistic logics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in sec. 2 classical subexponential logic
is introduced, together with its focused sequent calculus and well known instances; in
sec. 3 its intuitionistic restriction is presented; then in sec. 4 the bidirectional encoding
between classical and intuitionistic subexponential logic is constructed. Details omitted
here for space reasons can be found in the accompanying technical report [6].
2 Classical subexponential logic
Subexponential logic borrows most of its syntax from linear logic [9]. As we are com-
paring focused systems, we adopt a polarised syntax from the beginning. Polarised for-
mulas will have exactly one of two polarities: positive (P, Q, . . .) constructed out of the
positive atoms and connectives, and negative (N, M, . . .) constructed out of the negative
atoms and connectives. These two classes of formulas are mutually recursive, mediated
by the indexed subexponential operators !z and ?z.
Notation 3 (syntax) Positive formulas (P, Q) and negative formulas (N, M) have the
following grammar:
P, QF p
∣∣∣ P ⊗ Q
∣∣∣ 1
∣∣∣ P ⊕ Q
∣∣∣ 0
∣∣∣ !zN+ (positive)
N, M F n
∣∣∣ N & M
∣∣∣ ⊤
∣∣∣ N M M
∣∣∣ ⊥
∣∣∣ P⊸ N
∣∣∣ ?zP− (negative)
Atomic formulas are written in lower case (a, b, . . .), with p and q reserved for positive
and n and m reserved for negative atomic formulas. P− denotes either a positive formula
or a negative atom, and likewise N+ denotes a negative formula or a positive atom. We
write A, B, . . . for any arbitrary formula (positive or negative).
Because we will eventually consider its intuitionistic restriction, we retain implication
⊸ as a primitive even though it is classically definable. However, we exclude the non-
linear implication (⊃) because the unrestricted zones are non-canonical; i.e., there are
many such implications, each defined using a suitable subexponential (or compositions
thereof). The subscript z in exponential connectives denotes zones drawn from a subex-
ponential signature (using the terminology of [15]).
Definition 4 A subexponential signature Σ is a structure 〈Z,≤, l, U〉 where:
– 〈Z,≤〉 is a non-empty pre-ordered set (the “zones”);
– l ∈ Z is a “working” zone;
– U ⊆ Z is a set of unrestricted zones that is ≤-closed, i.e., for every z1, z2 ∈ Z, if
z1 ≤ z2, then z1 ∈ U implies z2 ∈ U. Z \ U will be called the restricted zones.
We use u, v, w to denote unrestricted zones and r, s, t to denote restricted zones.
Unrestricted zones admit both weakening and contraction, while restricted zones
are linear. The logic is parametric on the signature. (Particular mentions of the signature
will be omitted unless necessary to disambiguate, in which case they will be written in
a subscript.) We use use a two-sided sequent calculus formulation of the logic in order
to avoid appeals to De Morgan duality. This will not only simplify the definition of the
intuitionistic restriction (sec. 3), but will also be crucial to the main adequacy result.
Formulas in contexts are annotated with their subexponential zones as follows: z : A
will stand for A occurring in zone denoted by z, and z : (A1, . . . , Ak) for z : A1, . . . , z : Ak.
Sequents are of the following kinds:
Γ ⊢ [P] ; ∆ right focus on P
Γ ; [N] ⊢ ∆ left focus on N
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆ active on Ω and Ξ
The contexts in these sequents have the following restrictions:
– All elements of the left passive context Γ are of the form z : N+.
– All elements of the right passive context ∆ are of the form z : P−.
– All elements of the left active context Ω are of the form P−.
– All elements of the right active context Ξ are of the form N+.
Notation 5 We write Γu or ∆u for those contexts containing only unrestricted elements,
i.e., each element is of the form u : A with u ∈ U. Likewise, we write Γr or ∆r for contexts
containing only restricted elements.
The rules of the calculus are presented in fig. 1. Focused sequent calculi presented
in this style, which is a stylistic variant of Andreoli’s original formulation [1], have an
intensional reading in terms of phases. At the boundaries of phases are sequents of the
form Γ ; · ⊢ · ; ∆, which are known as neutral sequents. Proofs of neutral sequents
proceed (reading from conclusion to premises) as follows:
1. Decision: a focus is selected from a neutral sequent, either from the left or the right
context. This focused formula is moved to its corresponding focused zone using one
of the rules rdr, udr, rdl and udl (u/r = “unrestricted”/“restricted”, d = “decision”,
and r/l = “right”/“left”). These decision rules copy the focused formula iff it occurs
in an unrestricted zone.
2. Focused phase: for a left or a right focused sequent, left or right focus rules are
applied to the formula under focus. These focused rules are all non-invertible in the
(unfocused) sequent calculus and therefore depend on essential choices made in the
proof. In all cases except !zr and ?zl the focus persists to the subformulas (if any)
(right focus)
Γu, z : p ⊢
[
p
]
; ∆u
pr
Γu,Γr1 ⊢ [P] ; ∆u,∆r1 Γu,Γr2 ⊢ [Q] ; ∆u,∆r2
Γu, Γr1,Γ
r
2 ⊢ [P ⊗ Q] ; ∆u,∆r1,∆r2
⊗r
Γu ⊢ [1] ; ∆u 1r
Γ ⊢ [Pi] ; ∆
Γ ⊢ [P1 ⊕ P2] ; ∆
⊕ri
Γ ; · ⊢ N+ ; ∆
(
∀x : A ∈ Γ,∆. z ≤ x
)
Γ ⊢
[!zN+
]
; ∆
!zr
(left focus)
Γu ; [n] ⊢ ∆u, z : n nl
Γ ; [Pi] ⊢ ∆
Γ ; [P1 & P2] ⊢ ∆&li
Γu, Γr1 ; [N] ⊢ ∆u,∆r1 Γu,Γr2 ; [M] ⊢ ∆u,∆r2
Γu,Γr1,Γ
r
2 ; [N M M] ⊢ ∆u,∆r1,∆r2
Ml
Γu ; [⊥] ⊢ ∆u ⊥l
Γu,Γr1 ⊢ [P] ; ∆u,∆r1 Γu,Γr2 ; [M] ⊢ ∆u,∆r2
Γu,Γr1,Γ
r
2 ; [P⊸ M] ⊢ ∆u,∆r1,∆r2
⊸l
Γ ; P− ⊢ · ; ∆
(
∀x : A ∈ Γ,∆. z ≤ x
)
Γ ;
[?zP−
]
⊢ ∆
?zl
(right active)
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆, l : a
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, a ; ∆
ar
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, N ; ∆ Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, M ; ∆
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, N & M ; ∆ &r Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ,⊤ ; ∆⊤r
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, N, M ; ∆
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, N M M ; ∆Mr
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ,⊥ ; ∆
⊥r
Γ ; Ω, P ⊢ Ξ, N ; ∆
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, P⊸ N ; ∆
⊸r
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆, z : P−
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, ?zP− ; ∆
?zr
(left active)
Γ, l : a ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆
Γ ; Ω, a ⊢ Ξ ; ∆
al
Γ ; Ω, P, Q ⊢ Ξ ; ∆
Γ ; Ω, P ⊗ Q ⊢ Ξ ; ∆ ⊗l
Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆
Γ ; Ω, 1 ⊢ Ξ ; ∆ 1l
Γ ; Ω, P ⊢ Ξ ; ∆ Γ ; Ω, Q ⊢ Ξ ; ∆
Γ ; Ω, P ⊕ Q ⊢ Ξ ; ∆ ⊕l Γ ; Ω, 0 ⊢ Ξ ; ∆ 0l
Γ, z : N+ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆
Γ ; Ω, !zN+ ⊢ Ξ ; ∆
!zl
(decision)
Γ ⊢ [P] ; ∆
Γ ; · ⊢ · ; ∆, r : P
rdr
Γ ⊢ [P] ; ∆, u : P
Γ ; · ⊢ · ; ∆, u : P
udr
Γ ; [N] ⊢ ∆
Γ, r : N ; · ⊢ · ; ∆
rdl
Γ, u : N ; [N] ⊢ ∆
Γ, u : N ; · ⊢ · ; ∆
udl
Fig. 1. Focused sequent calculus for classical subexponential logic
of the focused formula. For binary rules, the restricted portions of the contexts are
separated and distributed to the two premises. This much should be familiar from
focusing for linear logic [1,7].
The two unusual rules for subexponential logic are !zr and ?zl, which are gener-
alizations of rules for the single exponential in ordinary linear logic. These rules
have a side condition that no formulas in a strictly ≤-smaller zone may be present
in the conclusion. If the working zone l is ≤-minimal (which is not necessarily the
case), then this side condition is trivial and the rules amount to a pure change of
polarities, similar to the ↑ and ↓ connectives of polarised linear logic [10]. For the
other zones, this rule tests for the emptiness of some of the zones. It is this selective
emptiness test that gives subexponential logic its expressive power [15,14].
3. Active phase: once the exponential rules !zr and ?zl are applied, the sequents be-
come active and left and right active rules are applied. The order of the active rules
is immaterial as all orderings will produce the same list of neutral sequent premises.
In Andreoli’s system the irrelevant non-determinism in the order of these rules was
removed by treating the active contexts Ξ and Ω as ordered contexts; however, we
do not fix any particular ordering.
In the traditional model of focusing, the above three steps repeat, in that order, in
the entire proof. The focused system can therefore be seen as a system of synthetic
inference rules (sometimes known as bipoles) for neutral sequents. It is possible to give
a very general presentation of such synthetic inference systems, for which we can prove
completeness and cut-elimination in a very general fashion [5]. It is also possible, with
some non-trivial effort, to show completeness of the focused calculus without appealing
to synthetic rules [7,11]. We do not delve into such proofs in this paper because this
ground is well trodden. Indeed, a focused completeness theorem for a very similar (but
more general) formulation of subexponential logic can be found in [14, chapter 6]. The
synthetic soundness and completeness theorems are as follows, proof omitted:
Fact 6 (synthetic soundness and completeness) Write  for the sequent arrow for an
unfocused variant of the calculus of fig. 1, obtained by placing the focused and active
formulas in the l zone and relaxing the focusing discipline.1
1. If Γ ; · ⊢ · ; ∆, then Γ  ∆ (synthetic soundness).
2. If Γ, l :Ω  l :Ξ,∆ then Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆ (synthetic completeness). ⊓⊔
Despite its somewhat esoteric formulation, it is easy to see how subexponential
logic generalizes classical substructural logics.
Fact 7 (familiar instances)
– Polarised classical multiplicative additive linear logic (MALL) is determined by
mall = 〈{l}, ·, l, ∅〉. The injections between the two polarised classes, sometimes
known as shifts, are as follows: ↓= !l and ↑= ?l.
1 This is basically Gentzen’s LK in two-sided form for subexponential logic.
– Polarised classical linear logic (CLL) is determined by ll = 〈{l, u}, l ≤ u, l, {u}〉. In
addition to the injections of mall, we also have the exponentials ! = !u and ? = ?u.
– Polarised classical logic (CL) is given by the signature l = 〈{l}, ·, l, {l}〉. ⊓⊔
In addition to such instances produced by instantiating the subexponential signature,
it is also possible to get the unpolarised versions of these logics by applying !l and ?l to
immediate negative (resp. positive) subformulas of positive (resp. negative) formulas.
3 Intuitionistic subexponential logic
One direct way of defining intuitionistic fragments of classical logics is as follows:
Definition 8 (intuitionistic restriction) Given a two-sided sequent calculus, its intu-
itionistic restriction is that fragment where all inference rules are constrained to have
exactly a single formula on the right hand sides of sequents.
The practical import of this restriction is that the connectives M and ⊥ disappear,
because their right rules require two and zero conclusions, respectively. As a result,
⊸ becomes a primitive because its classical definition requires M (and De Morgan
duals, which are also missing with the intuitioistic restriction). In a slight break from
tradition [9,16,2], we retain ?z in the intuitionistic syntax. The intuitionistic restriction
produces the following kinds of sequents:
Γ ⊢ [P] right focus on P
Γ ; [N] ⊢ z : Q− left focus on N
Γ ; Ω ⊢ N+ ; · active on Ω and N+
Γ ; Ω ⊢ · ; z : Q− active on Ω
We shall use γ to stand for the right hand forms—either N+ ; · or · ; z : Q−—for active
sequents above. The full collection of rules is given in fig. 2. As before, we use Q−
(resp. N+) to refer to a positive formula or negative atom (resp. negative formula or
positive atom).
The nature of subexponential signatures does not change in moving from classical to
intuitionistic logic. The decision rule udr obviously cannot copy the right formula in the
intuitionistic case. Thus, both the right decision rules collapse; ?z takes on an additional
modal aspect and is no longer the perfect dual of !z. The standard explanation of this
loss of symmetry in the exponentials is the creation of a new possibility judgement that
is weaker than linear truth; see [3] for such a reconstruction of the intuitionistic ?.
The proof of completeness for focused intuitionistic subexponential logic has never
been published. However, any similar proof for intuitionistic linear logic, such as [7,11],
can be adapted. Again, we simply state the synthetic version of the theorems here with-
out proof.
Fact 9 (synthetic soundness and completeness) Write  for the sequent arrow for an
unfocused variant of the calculus of fig. 2, obtained by placing the focused and active
formulas in the l zone and relaxing the focusing discipline.
1. If Γ ; · ⊢ · ; z : Q−, then Γ  z : Q−.
(right focus)
Γu, z : p ⊢
[
p
] pr
Γu,Γr1 ⊢ [P] Γu,Γr2 ⊢ [Q]
Γu,Γr1,Γ
r
2 ⊢ [P ⊗ Q]
⊗r
Γu ⊢ [1] 1r
Γ ⊢ [Pi]
Γ ⊢ [P1 ⊕ P2]
⊕ri
Γ ; · ⊢ N+ ; ·
(
∀x : A ∈ Γ. z ≤ x
)
Γ ⊢
[!zN+
] !zr
(left focus)
Γu ; [n] ⊢ z : n nl
Γ ; [Pi] ⊢ z : Q−
Γ ; [P1 & P2] ⊢ z : Q− &li
Γu,Γr1 ⊢ [P] Γu,Γr2 ; [M] ⊢ z : Q−
Γu,Γr1,Γ
r
2 ; [P⊸ M] ⊢ z : Q−
⊸l
Γ ; P− ⊢ · ; y : Q− (∀x : A ∈ Γ, y : Q−. z ≤ x)
Γ ;
[
?zP−
]
⊢ y : Q− ?zl
right active
Γ ; Ω ⊢ · ; l : a
Γ ; Ω ⊢ a ; ·
ar
Γ ; Ω ⊢ N ; · Γ ; Ω ⊢ M ; ·
Γ ; Ω ⊢ N & M ; · &r Γ ; Ω ⊢ ⊤ ; · ⊤r
Γ ; Ω, P ⊢ N ; ·
Γ ; Ω ⊢ P⊸ N ; ·
⊸r
Γ ; Ω ⊢ · ; z : P
Γ ; Ω ⊢ ?zP ; ·
?zr
(left active)
Γ, l : a ; Ω ⊢ γ
Γ ; Ω, a ⊢ γ
al
Γ ; Ω, P, Q ⊢ γ
Γ ; Ω, P ⊗ Q ⊢ γ ⊗l
Γ ; Ω ⊢ γ
Γ ; Ω, 1 ⊢ γ 1l
Γ ; Ω, P ⊢ γ Γ ; Ω, Q ⊢ γ
Γ ; Ω, P ⊕ Q ⊢ γ ⊕l Γ ; Ω, 0 ⊢ γ 0l
Γ, z : N ; Ω ⊢ γ
Γ ; Ω, !zN ⊢ γ
!zl
(decision)
Γ ⊢ [P]
Γ ; · ⊢ · ; z : P
dr
Γ ; [N] ⊢ z : Q−
Γ, r : N ; · ⊢ · ; z : Q− rdl
Γ, u : N ; [N] ⊢ z : Q−
Γ, u : N ; · ⊢ · ; z : Q− udl
Fig. 2. Focused sequent calculus for intuitionstic subexponential logic
2. If Γ, l :Ω  z : Q− then Γ ; Ω ⊢ · ; z : Q−.
3. If Γ, l :Ω  l : N then Γ ; Ω ⊢ N ; ·. ⊓⊔
The intuitionstic restrictions of the familiar instances from defn. 7 simply use the same
subexponential signatures.
4 Focally adequate encodings
This section contains the main technical contribution of this paper: focally adequate
encodings (defn. 2) that are generic on subexponential signatures. At the level of focal
adequacy, therefore, the asymmetry in the expressive power of classical and intuition-
istic logics disappears.
4.1 Classical in intuitionistic
To introduce the mechanisms of encoding, we first look at the unsurprising direction:
a classical logic in its own intuitionistic restriction. The well known double negation
translation, if performed clumsily, can break even full adequacy. For example, if NMM
is translated as ¬(!l¬!lN ⊗ !l¬!lM) where ¬P , P ⊸ k where k is some fixed negative
atom that is not used in classical logic. In the rule Mr under this encoding, there are
instances of !l that have no counterpart in the classical side. Indeed, there is no derived
rule in the classical focused calculus that allows one to conclude Γ ; · ⊢ N M M ; ·
from Γ ; · ⊢ · ; !lN, !lM, which is what would result if the active phase could be sus-
pended arbitrarily and the subformula property were discarded. Such a rule is certainly
admissible, but admissibile rules do not preserve bijections between proofs, and are
only definable for full proofs in any case.
How does one encode classical logic in its intuitionistic restriction such that polar-
ities are respected? The above example suggests an obvious answer: when translating
N M M as if it were right-active, do not also translate the subformulas M and N as if
they were right-active, for they will be sent to the left. Instead, translate them as if they
were left-active.2
Definition 10 (encoding classical formulas)
– The encoding (−)= from classical positive (resp. negative) formulas to intuitionistic
positive (resp. negative) formulas is as follows:
(p)= = p (!zN)= = !z (N)= (P ⊗ Q)= = (P)= ⊗ (Q)= (1)= = 1
(P ⊕ Q)= = (P)= ⊕ (Q)= (0)= = 0 (N)= = ¬ (N),
– The encoding (−), from classical negative (resp. positive) formulas to intuitionstic
positive (resp. negative) formulas is as follows:
(n), = n⊥ (?zP), = !z (P), (N M N), = (N), ⊗ (M), (⊥), = 1
(N & M), = (N), ⊕ (M), (⊤), = 0 (P⊸ N), = (P)= ⊗ (N), (P), = ¬ (P)=
where for every negative atom n, there is a positive atom n⊥ in the encoding.
2 The astute reader might recall that this is the essence of Kuroda’s encodings.
Contexts are translated element-wise.
Definition 11 (encoding classical sequents) The encoding (−)⊥⊥ of classical sequents as
intuitionistic sequents is as follows:
(Γ ⊢ [P] ; ∆)⊥⊥ = (Γ)= , (∆), ⊢ [(P)=] (Γ ; [N] ⊢ ∆)⊥⊥ = (Γ)= , (∆), ⊢ [(N),]
(Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ ; ∆)⊥⊥ = (Γ)= , (∆), ; (Ω)= , (Ξ), ⊢ · ; l : k
In other words, focused sequents are translated to right-focused sequents, and ac-
tive sequents to left-active sequents. The right contexts are dualised and sent to the left
where the intuitionistic restriction does not apply, while the left focus on negative for-
mulas is turned into a right focus because of the lack of a multiplicative left-focused
rule (except⊸l which would cause an inadvertent polarity switch).
Theorem 12 The encoding of defn. 11 is focally adequate (defn. 2).
Proof. We will inventory the classical rules in fig. 1, and in each case compute the intu-
itionistic synthetic derivations of the encoding of the conclusion of the classical rules.
Here are the interesting3 cases, with the double inference lines denoting (un)folding
of defns. 10 and 11, and the rule names written with the prefix c/ or i/ to distinguish
between classical and intuitionistic respectively.
– cases of c/pr and c/!r :
(Γu)= , z : p, (∆u), ⊢ [p] i/pr
(Γu)= , (z : p)= , (∆u), ⊢ [p]
(
Γu, z : p ⊢
[
p
]
; ∆u
)⊥⊥
(Γ ; · ⊢ N ; ∆)⊥⊥
(Γ)= , (∆), ; (N), ⊢ · ; l : k
(Γ)= , (∆), ; (N), ⊢ k ; · i/?lr
(Γ)= , (∆), ; · ⊢ ¬ (N), ; · i/⊸r
(Γ)= , (∆), ⊢
[
!z¬ (N),
] i/!zr
(Γ)= , (∆), ⊢ [(!zN)=]
(
Γ ⊢
[!zN
]
; ∆
)⊥⊥
All the logical rules used are invertible. The boxed instance of i/?lr requires some
explanation: obviously a left active rule on (N), can be applied before this rule.
However, since they are both active rules, the choice of which to perform first is
immaterial as they will produce the same neutral premises. If we want local—not
focal—adequacy, we will have to impose a right-to-left ordering on the active rules.
The case of c/nl and c/?l is similar.
– case of c/Mr :
(Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, N, M ; ∆)⊥⊥
(Γ)= , (∆), ; (Ω)= , (Ξ), , (N), , (M), ⊢ · ; l : k
(Γ)= , (∆), ; (Ω)= , (Ξ), , (N), ⊗ (M), ⊢ · ; l : k i/⊗l
(Γ)= , (∆), ; (Ω)= , (Ξ), , (N M M), ⊢ · ; l : k
(Γ ; Ω ⊢ Ξ, N M M ; ∆)⊥⊥
The cases of c/⊥r, c/!zl and c/?zr are similar.
3 See [6] for the remaining cases.
– case of c/rdr :
(
Γu1,Γ
r
2 ⊢ [P] ; ∆u1,∆r2
)⊥⊥
(
Γu1,Γ
r
2
)=
,
(
∆u1,∆
r
2
),
⊢
[(P)=]
(
Γu1
)=
,
(
∆u1
),
; [k] ⊢ l : k
i/nl
(
Γu1,Γ
r
2
)=
,
(
∆u1,∆
r
2
),
;
[
¬ (P)=] ⊢ l : k
i/⊸l
(
Γu1,Γ
r
2
)=
,
(
∆u1,∆
r
2
),
, r :¬ (P)= ; · ⊢ · ; l : k
i/rdl
(
Γu1,Γ
r
2
)=
,
(
∆u1,∆
r
2
),
, (r : P), ; · ⊢ · ; l : k
(
Γu1, Γ
r
2 ; · ⊢ · ; ∆
u
1,∆
r
2, r : P
)⊥⊥
Note that the right premise is forced to terminate in the same phase. This would
not be possible if, instead of k, we were to use some other negative formula such as
?l0. In the presence of some unrestricted subexponential u, we might have used ?u0
instead (note that, classically, ?u0 ≡ ⊥). ⊓⊔
Corollary 13
– There is a focally adequate encoding of classical MALL in intuitionistic MALL.
– There is a focally adequate encoding of CLL in ILL.
– There is a focally adequate encoding of CL in IL.
Proof. Instantiate thm. 12 on the subexponential signatures from defn. 7. ⊓⊔
These instances are all apparently novel, partly because focal adequacy of classical
logics in their own intuitionistic restrictions has not been deeply investigated. In the
work on LJF [11] there is a focally adequate encoding of classical logic in intuitionistic
linear logic, which can be seen as a combination of the second and third of the above
instances.
4.2 Intuitionistic in classical
The previous subsection showed that the intuitionistic restriction of a classical logic can
adequately encode the classical logic itself. This is not the case in the other direction
without further modifications to the subexponential signature. It is easy to see this:
consider just the MALL fragment and the problem of encoding the i/⊸l rule. If ⊸ is
encoded as itself, then in the classical side we have the following derived rule (all the
zones are l, and elided):
Γ ⊢ [P] ; Q− Γ ; [N] ⊢ ·
Γ ; [P⊸ N] ⊢ Q−
This rule has no intuitionistic counterpart. Therefore, the encoding of ⊸ must prevent
the right formula Q− from being sent to the left branch, i.e., to test that the rest of the
right context in a right focus is empty. MALL itself cannot perform this test because it
lacks any truly modal operators. Exactly the same problem exists for the encoding of
IL in CL, which also lacks any true modal operators.
Quite obviously, the encoding of ⊸ requires some means of testing the emptiness
of contexts. CLL (defn. 7) has an additional zone u that is greater than l, and therefore !u
can test for the absence of any l-formulas. It turns out that this is enough to get a focally
adequate encoding of IL as follows: the sole zone l of IL is split into two, lr (restricted)
and lu (unrestricted), and the right hand side of IL sequents is encoded with lr . Then,
whenever P is of the form !lN, the translation of it on the right is of the form !lu M. In
the rest of this subsection, we will systematically extend this observation to an arbitrary
subexponential signature.
Definition 14 (signature splitting) Let a subexponential signature Σ = 〈Z,≤, l, U〉 be
given. Write:
–
ˆZ for the zone set (Z × {l})∪ (Z × {r}), where l and r are distinct labels for the left
and the right of the sequents, respectively, and × is the Cartesian product. Z × {l}
will be called the left form of ˆZ, and Z × {r} will be called its right form.
–
ˆU for the unrestricted zone set U × {l}.
–
ˆl for the working zone (l, l).
– ≤ˆ for the smallest relation on ˆZ × ˆZ for which:
– (x, l) ≤ˆ (y, l) if x ≤ y;
– (x, r) ≤ˆ (y, r) if x ≤ y; and
– (x, r) ≤ˆ (x, l) and (x, l) ˆ (x, r).
The subexponential signature ˆΣ =
〈
ˆZ, ≤ˆ, ˆl, ˆU
〉
will be called the split form of Σ.
We intend to treat the right form specially. The zones in the right form are restricted,
which encodes the linearity of the right hand side inherent in the intuitionistic restric-
tion (defn. 8). Our encoding will guarantee that the right hand sides of sequents in the
encoding contain no zones in the left form. Thus, when !(z,l)N is under right focus, the
side condition on the !r rule will ensure that there are no other formulas on the right
hand side, because the right forms are made pointwise smaller than their left forms. Du-
ally, on the left we shall use ?(z,r) to encode ?z; since the right form zones are pointwise
smaller than the left form zones, but retain the pre-split ordering inside their own zone,
the side conditions enforce the same occurrences as in the source calculus.
Definition 15 (encoding intuitionistic contexts)
– The left-passive context Γ is encoded pointwise using the translation (−)lp:
(
z : N+
)lp
= (z, l) : (N+)lp (p)lp = p (N)lp = (N)lf
– A left-focused formula N is encoded using the translation (−)lf:
(n)lf = n (?zP−)lf = ?(z,r) (P−)la (N & M)lf = (N)lf & (M)lf (⊤)lf = ⊤
(P⊸ N)lf = (P)rf ⊸ (N)lf
– A right-focused formula P is encoded using the translation (−)rf:
(p)rf = p (!zN+)rf = !(z,l) (N+)ra (P ⊗ Q)rf = (P)rf ⊗ (Q)rf (1)rf = 1
(P ⊕ Q)rf = (P)rf ⊕ (Q)rf (0)rf = 0
– A left-active context Ω is encoded pointwise using the translation (−)la:
(a)la = !(l,l)a (!zN+)la = !(z,l) (N+)lp (P ⊗ Q)la = (P)la ⊗ (Q)la (1)la = 1
(P ⊕ Q)la = (P)la ⊕ (Q)la (0)la = 0
– A right-active formula N+ is encoded using the translation (−)ra:
(a)ra = !(l,r)a (?zP−)ra = ?(z,r) (P−)rp (N & M)ra = (N)ra & (M)ra (⊤)ra = ⊤
(P⊸ N)ra = (P)la⊸ (N)ra
– A right-passive zoned formula z : P− is encoded using the translation (−)rp:
(
z : P−
)rp
= (z, r) : (P−)rp (n)rp = n (P)rp = (P)rf
The cases for (!zN+)rf and (?zP−)lf will be crucial for the proof of thm. 17. Most of the
remaining cases can be seen as an abstract interpretation of the focused rules (fig. 2)
on the various contexts. The definition of the encoding of intuitionistic sequents is now
completely systematic.
Definition 16 (encoding intuitionistic sequents) The encoding (−)?! of intuitionistic se-
quents as classical sequents is as follows:
(
Γ ⊢ [P])?! = (Γ)lp ⊢
[
(P)rf
]
; ·
(
Γ ; [N] ⊢ z : Q−)?! = (Γ)lp ;
[
(N)lf
]
⊢
(
z : Q−)rp
(
Γ ; Ω ⊢ N+ ; ·
)?!
= (Γ)lp ; (Ξ)la ⊢ (N+)ra ; · (Γ ; Ω ⊢ · ; z : Q−)?! = (Γ)lp ; (Ξ)la ⊢ · ; (z : Q−)rp
Observe that the right hand sides of the encoding have the intuitionistic restriction
(defn. 8). This restriction will be enforced at every transtion from a focused to an active
phase, which is enough because the active rules cannot increase the size of the right
contexts.
Theorem 17 The encoding of defn. 16 is focally adequate (defn. 2).
Proof. As before for thm. 12, we shall prove this by inventorying the intuitionistic rules
of fig. 2, encode the conclusions of each of these rules, and observe whether the neutral
premises of the derived inference rules are in bijection with those of the fig. 2. All but
the following important cases are omitted here for space reasons.4
– cases of i/pr and i/!zr :
(Γu)lp , z : p ⊢ [p] c/pr
(Γu)lp , (z : p)lp ⊢
[
(p)rf
]
(
Γu, z : p ⊢
[
p
])?!
(
Γ ; · ⊢ N+ ; ·
)?!
(Γ)lp ; · ⊢ (N+)la ; ·
(Γ)lp ⊢
[
!(z,l) (N+)la
]
; ·
c/!r
(Γ)lp ⊢
[
(!zN+)rf
]
; ·
(
Γ ⊢
[!zN+
])?!
The boxed instance of c/!r is valid because all the zoned formulas in (Γ)lp are in
the left form zones, as is the zone of the ! itself, so the comparison ≤ˆ is the same as
≤ on the intuitionistic zones (defn. 14).
4 See [6].
– case of i/⊸l :
(
Γu, Γr1 ⊢ [P]
)?!
(
Γu,Γr1
)lp
⊢
[
(P)rf
]
; ·
(
Γu,Γr2 ; [N] ⊢ z : Q−
)?!
(
Γu,Γr2
)lp
;
[
(N)lf
]
⊢ (z : Q−)rp
(
Γu,Γr1,Γ
r
2
)lp
;
[
(P)rf ⊸ (N)lf
]
⊢ (z : Q−)rp
c/⊸l
(
Γu, Γr1,Γ
r
2
)lp
;
[
(P⊸ N)lf
]
⊢ (z : Q−)rp
(
Γu,Γr1,Γ
r
2 ; [P⊸ N] ⊢ z : Q−
)?!
The boxed instance of c/⊸l contains the only split of the right context that can
succeed in the same focused phase, i.e., reach an initial sequent or a phase tran-
sition, becaue that (P)rf eventually produces either a positive atom (which must
finish the proof with c/pr and since right form zones are restricted (z : Q−)rp cannot
be present) or a !(z,l) which guarantees that the rest of the right context is empty.
– cases of i/?zl and dr :
(
Γ ; P− ⊢ · ; y : Q−)?!
(Γ)lp ; (P−)la ⊢ · ; (y : Q−)rp
(Γ)lp ;
[
?(z,r) (P−)la
]
⊢ (y : Q−)rp
c/?l
(Γ)lp ;
[
(?zP−)lf
]
⊢ (y : Q−)rp
(
Γ ;
[?zP−
]
⊢ y : Q−)?!
Γ ⊢ [P]
(Γ)lp ⊢
[
(P)rf
]
; ·
(Γ)lp ; · ⊢ · ; (z, r) : (P)rf c/rdr
(Γ)lp ; · ⊢ · ; (z : P)rp
(
Γ ; · ⊢ · ; z : P
)?!
The boxed instance of c/?l is justified because the subscript zone (z, r) is of the right
form (in order to compare with (y, r)) which is ≤ˆ-smaller than its corresponding
left-form zone (defn. 14). Note that it is crucial for soundness to have (z, r) not be
smaller than all left form zones. Since right form zones are restricted, there is no
copying in the boxed instance of c/rdr. The other decision cases are similar. ⊓⊔
We note one important direct corollary of thm. 17.
Corollary 18 (intuitionistic logic in classical linear logic) There is a focally adequate
encoding of intuitiontistic logic in classical linear logic.
It is well known [9] that (classical) linear logic can encode the intuitionistic impli-
cation ⊃ as follows: A ⊃ B , !A ⊸ B. However, this encoding is only globally ade-
quate [16]. It is possible to refine this encoding to obtain a fully adequate encoding [12]
in an enriched classical linear logic which is not apparently an instance of classical
subexponential logic. Corollary 18 further improves our undertanding of encodings of
intuitionistic implicication by permuting ! into the antecedent of the implication until
there is a phase change, which removes the bureaucratic polarity switch inherent in this
implication.5
Proof (of cor. 18). The split of the signature l (defn. 7) is isomorphic to the signature
ll, so apply thm. 17. ⊓⊔
5 Note that the polarised intuitionistic implication P ⊸ N, if encoded using Girard’s encoding,
would be !↑P⊸ N, which breaks the polarisation of the antecedent.
5 Conclusions
Section 4 shows that any given classical (resp. intuitionistic) subexponential logic can
be encoded in a related intuitionistic (resp. classical) subexponential logic such that
partial synthetic derivations are preserved. This is a technical result, with at least one of
the directions of encoding being novel. It strongly suggests that one of the fractures in
logic identified by Miller in [13]—the classical/intuitionistic divide—might be healed
by analyses and algorithms that are generic on subexponential signatures. One might
still favour “classical” or “intuitionistic” dialects for proofs, but neither format is more
fundamental.
The results of this paper have two caveats. First, we only consider the “restricted” or
the “unrestricted” flavours of subexponentials; in [8] there were also subexponentials
of the “strict” and “affine” flavours for which our results here do not extend directly.
Second, we do not consider encodings involving non-propositional kinds, such as terms
or frames. Subexponentials are still useful for such stronger encodings, but representa-
tional adequacy may not be as straightforward.
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